1. 漏洞描述

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

watch_queue: Fix filter limit check

In watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check
that the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap
can hold. One place calculates the number of bits by:

if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8)

which is fine, but the second does:

if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG)

which is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to
a too-large type:

(1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter
(2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated.

Fix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the
number of types we actually know about.

The bug may cause an oops looking something like:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611
...
Call Trace:
<TASK&gt;
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
...
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
...
watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740
...
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Allocated by task 611:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)

2. 影响范围

3. 影响组件

4. 修复版本

5. 修复方法

6. 下载链接